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Abstract: We review the theoretical literature on defined benefit (DB) pension 
plans, particularly focusing on the issue of plan underfunding and benefit 
guarantee insurance schemes. The literature shows that underfunding can, 
under reasonable assumptions, be an equilibrium outcome even in the absence 
of benefit insurance. The introduction of benefit guarantee funds was a reaction 
to the problem of underfunding, and we summarize the ensuing standard 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. We briefly discuss the small 
empirical research on the subject and propose directions for future research. 
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There is growing concern about the funding status of defined benefit (DB) 
pension plans both in Canada and internationally. Although the number of 
Canadian DB plans has steadily decreased in the last years, there are still a 
large number of employees (both in the private and public sectors) that rely on 
this type of plan for their retirement. Unfortunately, DB plans currently seem 
much less secure than initially anticipated and many current and future retirees 
might receive less than expected out of their pensions. This has prompted 
reaction by policy makers and formulated calls for reform of the DB plan 
institutional framework. Ontario recently appointed the Expert Commission on 
Pensions and discussions on reforms have been ongoing in the United States.
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In this paper we summarize the current state of the art of the literature regarding 
the aspect of DB pension plan funding and benefit insurance. Our main focus is 
on the theoretical literature, but we will briefly discuss empirical aspects mainly to 
outline future directions of research. 
 
The literature converges on two main theoretical results. First, once we step 
away from perfectly competitive labour and financial markets we generally 
observe that underfunding of DB plans is an equilibrium outcome, even in the 
absence of pension benefit insurance.
2
                                            
1   Wilcox (2006) is an exhaustive discussion paper on the reforms in the U.S. 
2   Besley and Prat discuss DB plans in terms of credibility issues. 
  1Second the introduction of pension benefit insurance is a reaction to the problem 
of underfunding and gives rise to an additional set of theoretical results along the 
standard insurance problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. 
 
Underfunding has been documented empirically. However, the effects of benefit 
insurance have, while well established theoretically, not received much attention. 
We outline suggestions of future research using the “natural experiment” 
institutional setting in Canada. 
 
The reminder of the paper is structured as follow. Section 2 reviews the current 
state of the theoretical literature regarding underfunding as an equilibrium 
outcome without pension benefit insurance and the issues arising from 
introducing such insurance. Section 3 briefly discusses empirical work, both 
existing and future, and Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  Review of the theoretical literature 
 
2.1  Underfunding as an equilibrium outcome without benefit guarantee 
insurance 
 
Under perfectly competitive markets underfunding of pension plans will not be an 
issue. The wage rate will be determined by market forces and workers will 
acknowledge pensions as a part of their remuneration package. Workers will 
  2essentially pay for their pensions, while firms act as insurance providers. As long 
as firms are less risk averse than individual workers this improves efficiency (see 
Gustman et al.,1994, p. 422). 
 
While the assumption of perfectly competitive markets renders the studying of 
pension issues somewhat uninteresting it is also an unrealistic one. Indeed 
Ippolito (1987) writes “[defined benefit p]ensions appear to offer a classic 
example of a product that could not survive in an unfettered competitive 
market…” He offers an “implicit contract” theory (Ippolito, 1985a) of DB pension 
plans, where workers hold an unsecured bond of the firm. In this framework 
workers expect firms to fulfill pension promises.
3 As a consequence, the discount 
rate to calculate economic liabilities is different from the nominal interest rate, 
and different from what is usually applied in reports to regulatory authorities.
4 
Implications of the model are i) a reduced mobility of workers and ii) the incentive 
of workers to contribute more heavily into the pension plan early in the career 
(with the respective consequences for the wage-tenure profile). In terms of the 
funding status of pension plans firms have an incentive to underfund pension 
plans in equilibrium, hence “… workers have a direct financial stake in the firm…” 
(Ippolito, 1985a, p. 1041). The degree of underfunding can be quite substantial. 
In a follow up analysis, Ippolito (1986) calculates the funding status of U.S. DB 
                                            
3   Ippolito (1985) describes the alternative framework as a “legal” view of pension plans, 
where workers expect firms to terminate plans at any point in time. He offers empirical 
evidence that supports the implicit contract view of pensions, see below. 
4   More specifically, the “legal” framework implies the nominal interest rate as the discount 
rate, while the rate appropriate within the “implicit contract” framework is the difference 
between the nominal growth rates of wages and the nominal interest rate. 
  3pension plans for 1978 and 1981. The average funding ratio was 65.5% and 
76.8% respectively. 
 
Again Ippolito (1985b) and within the implicit contract framework shows that firms 
can use underfunded pension plans as a tool to discipline hold-up incentives by 
unions. Again, within this model, underfunding of plans is an equilibrium 
outcome. 
 
Cooper and Ross (2002) take a different route. They build a model of an optimal 
labour contract for risk-averse workers that includes retirement pension. Workers 
are more risk-averse than firms, hence there is scope for a pension plan 
arrangement. Their Proposition 1 (p. 674) shows that if firms have sufficient 
internal funding wage profiles are constant and pensions are fully funded. 
 
Underfunded pensions arise when firms face borrowing restrictions (Proposition 
5).
5 If firms do not have access to sufficient internal capital they will offer upward 
sloping wage profiles while at the same time reducing the funding of the plan. 
The model rests on a financial market imperfection, however, one that is fairly 
plausible. 
 
To conclude, under fairly realistic assumptions of the working of labour and 
financial markets, underfunding of DB pension plans is an equilibrium outcome 
                                            
5   Alternatively, regulation on pension portfolios leading to interest rate differentials can lead 
to underfunding.  
  4even in the absence of pension benefit guarantee mechanisms. We next turn to 
the consequences of introduction such insurance. 
 
2.2  Theoretical aspects of pension benefit guarantee insurance 
 
The problem of underfunded DB pension plans was a driving element in the 
introduction of pension benefit guarantee insurance in most cases such schemes 
have been introduced, such as the Pension Benefit Guarantee Fund (PBGF) in 
the U.S. In Canada, where regulation of pension plans is at the provincial level, 
Ontario is the only jurisdiction with a benefit guarantee insurance. 
 
Interestingly, Ippolito (1987) in the union hold-up model provides an economic 
rationale for the introduction of the PBGF. In this model, a period of high inflation 
reduced the incentive of firms to use underfunding as a tool to hold unions in 
check, hence reducing their opposition to benefit insurance, while, on the other 
hand, unionized workers were able to obtain a significant transfer from the 
PBGF. This works in situations where the fraction of beneficiaries is small 
enough with respect to the overall universe of plan members, such that the 
additional cost of insurance is negligible for each individual. 
 
Benefit guarantee funds face challenges of their own. As usual in an insurance 
setting, these challenges can be analyzed along the lines of moral hazard and 
adverse selection. 
  5 
Cooper and Ross (2003) take up their model and discuss the introduction of 
public insurance in this setting. Again they look at an optimal labour contract with 
the additional feature that firms might face borrowing constraints. As before, 
underfunding can be an equilibrium outcome in the absence of benefit guarantee. 
When introducing a public benefit guarantee fund, they find that the problem of 
underfunding is accentuated; a standard moral hazard argument. Specifically, 
while firms with sufficient capital would fully fund pension plans in the absence of 
insurance and only firms with low levels of capital reduce funding of plans, the 
introduction of a benefit guarantee induces all firms to reduce contribution to the 
plan. 
 
Additionally, the authors look at the investment decision of plan managers by 
introducing a risky asset. While a risky asset might increase the funding tendency 
of firms in their plans it is also the case that risk exposure of the plan increases 
with minimal funding level. Hence, the introduction of a benefit guarantee might 
induce firms to increase their risk exposure. 
 
A different feature of moral hazard is presented in Niehaus (1990): High risk firms 
have the incentive to increase benefit levels. Niehaus builds a simple model, 
where the benefit insurance represents a put option for the firm, with the 
particular feature that the insurance fee does not depend on the default risk of 
  6plans.
6 The author shows that, as long as benefits are lower than the upper limit 
of the guarantee, the value of the put options increases with the level of promised 
benefits. Furthermore, this form of moral hazard increases with the level of 
underfunding of the plan. 
 
Finally, benefit insurance where insurance rates do not adequately reflect 
bankruptcy risks, might induce firms with well funded DB pension plans to 
terminate their plans (or convert them into defined contribution plans). This gives 
rise to a problem of adverse selection in the universe of plans benefiting from the 
insurance (see e.g. Wilcox, 2006, for a discussion). 
 
In summary, the existence of a benefit guarantee insurance can i) increase (but 
need not cause) the degree of underfunding; ii) induce plan managers to invest in 
risky portfolios; and iii) induce firms to terminate well funded plans. We next turn 




While the theoretical issues of underfunding of DB pension plans, with or without 
benefit insurance, have been analyzed quite extensively, the number of empirical 
applications is rather small. 
 
                                            
6   A so-called flat fee, a feature that was common for the PBGF both in the US and Ontario. 
  7Underfunding of pension plans is well documented. As mentioned above, Ippolito 
(1986) performs an evaluation on the funding status of a sample of U.S. DB 
plans and finds significant underfunding. Further, regulatory authorities both in 
Canada and internationally have been reporting concern about the funding status 
of plans.
7 Incidentally, Ippolito (1986) presents much lower funding ratios as 
reported by the PBGC, hence, the fact that regulatory authorities report 
underfunded plans implies that “true” economic liabilities (as suggested by 
Ippolito) are even higher. 
 
On the other hand, the effects of a benefit guarantee have been very scarcely 
explored. Niehaus supports his empirical model on moral hazard in benefit levels 
with an empirical analysis. He finds that plans which benefited from the 
introduction of the PBGC have significantly increased the level of benefits in the 
same period, compared to a control group that was not covered by the insurance 
(multi-employer plans). One important reason is that the PBGC is a federally 
administered program, thus, Niehaus’ analysis is based comparing plans before 
and after the introduction.  
 
The situation in Canada, with Ontario the only Province with a guarantee, is 
potentially quite different. Either a much more comprehensive sample could be 
built comparing plans across jurisdictions over time, or, even more promising, a 
difference-in-difference analysis could be carried out. One could expect much 
preciser estimates on the effect of benefit insurance, both along the moral hazard 
                                            
7   See, for example, Stewart (2007). 
  8and adverse selection lines. Such work would not only benefit the Canadian 
reform discussion but could give insights for other, similarly administrated, funds 
such as in the U.K or the U.S. 
 
To our knowledge, this special institutional setting has so far only been exploited 
in one study. Nielson and Chan (2006) study a panel of aggregate data on 
Canadian pension plans. Their explanatory variables are number of plans and 
plan assets. They find that Ontario DB plans have significantly higher levels of 
assets per participant than other provinces. The study, unfortunately, has to rely 
on a limited data set, as no information on plan liabilities is available to the 




The funding situation of defined benefit pension plans poses a significant threat 
to the retirement income of many current and future pension receivers. Even 
though the number of DB plans is decreasing, still a large number of workers rely 
on this type of plans for their retirement. Reforms are thus called for. 
 
In this paper we outline the current status of the theoretical literature on the 
issue. We highlight that underfunding of DB plan is a likely equilibrium outcome 
even in the absence of pension benefit guarantee mechanisms. Next, we discuss 
the consequences of these insurance schemes. Both moral hazard and adverse 
  9selection considerations arise. The degree of underfunding might be 
accentuated; plan sponsors have an incentive to invest in overly risky assets and 
increase the level of benefits in financially difficult situations; well funded plans 
might terminate their DB plans or convert them to DC ones. 
 
Empirical analysis of these theoretical results are very scarce. While the problem 
of underfunding is commonly reported, few studies look at the effects of benefit 
insurance. Canada has a unique situation in that only Ontario has such an 
insurance scheme, while the other provinces (and the federal authorities) do not. 
This gives the possibility to compare plan behaviour over time across different 
institutional settings or, potentially even more precisely, estimate the effects of 
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